Brent crude rose by about 65 per cent — $46 a barrel — by the end of March 2026, the largest monthly increase ever recorded, according to World Bank analysis of the Strait of Hormuz disruption. Global oil supply fell by 10.1 million barrels a day over the same month. Oil passed $100 a barrel again in late July as the conflict widened.
Those are the measurable facts. This article confines itself to them.
A great deal about this conflict is contested, fast-moving and asserted by parties with an interest in what is believed. Prices, cargo volumes and production figures are not. They are recorded by exchanges and agencies, they are revised in public, and they can be checked.
Why one strait moves the whole market
Roughly 13 million barrels of crude a day move through the Strait of Hormuz — about a fifth of global oil consumption. There is no meaningful way around it. The pipelines that bypass the strait carry a fraction of that volume, and the rest of the world’s spare capacity sits behind the same chokepoint.
The International Energy Agency has described the disruption as the largest supply interruption in the history of the oil market. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps announced the closure to shipping allied with the United States and Israel on 2 March 2026; Brent peaked near $118 a barrel shortly after. A ceasefire brokered by Pakistan on 8 April permitted partial reopening before restrictions were reimposed on 19 April.
What the World Bank measured
The Bank’s figures describe a market that lost supply faster than it lost demand — which is what turns a disruption into a price shock rather than a slowdown.
| Measure | Estimate |
|---|---|
| Brent rise to end-March | ~65% (+$46/bbl), largest monthly rise on record |
| Global supply fall, March | 10.1 mb/d |
| Q2 2026 supply decline | 6.9 mb/d (6.6%) year-on-year |
| Q2 2026 demand decline | 1.5 mb/d |
| Q2 2026 market deficit | 3.7 mb/d |
| 2026 baseline Brent | $86/bbl |
| 2027 baseline Brent | $70/bbl |
| Upside risk range | $95–$115/bbl (10–35% above baseline) |
The Q2 supply decline is the largest quarterly fall since the COVID-19 pandemic. Demand fell too — by 0.8 million barrels a day year-on-year in March, and a forecast 1.5 million in the second quarter — but nowhere near enough to close a 3.7 million barrel deficit.
Non-OPEC+ production outside the region grew by roughly 0.5 million barrels a day, chiefly in the United States. Against a 10.1 million barrel shortfall, that is a rounding error.
The forecast is a range, not a number
It is worth reading the Bank’s own framing carefully. Its baseline has Brent averaging $86 a barrel across 2026 and falling to $70 in 2027 — that is, an expectation that the disruption eases. Its upside risk case is $95 to $115.
A forecast that spans $45 is not a prediction. It is an admission that the outcome depends on a political question no economist can answer: how long the strait stays closed.
Goldman Sachs has said that another month of closure would put Brent above $100 for the year as a whole, with $120 in the third quarter and $115 in the fourth if restricted traffic runs longer than that. Those are a bank’s scenarios, not the World Bank’s, and they are stated here as such.
Who this lands on
The exposure is not evenly distributed, and it is not the producers who suffer most.
Countries that export through the strait lose revenue they cannot ship. Countries that import refined fuel — which includes several large oil producers — pay more for it immediately, and pass that into transport, food and manufacturing costs within weeks. Emerging markets outside the region, among them Brazil, India and Indonesia, are expected to keep growing demand regardless, which keeps the price up for everyone.
The second-order effect is the one that reaches households: an oil shock is an inflation shock with a lag of about a quarter.
Price, supply and demand estimates in this article are the World Bank’s, published in its analysis of the disruption, and are identified as estimates in its own text. Volume figures for the strait and the sequence of closures are drawn from public reporting. Pressly has no correspondents in the region and makes no claim about military events, casualties or the conduct of any party.
